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UKRAINIAN PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES CLASH IN TELEVISED DEBATE. Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych met in a 100-minute, live televised debate ahead of the 26 December repeat of last month's flawed presidential runoff. In contrast to their first debate on 15 November (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 16 November 2004), this time the two men were allowed to address each other directly with questions. Yushchenko accused Yanukovych's election staff and political patrons, including President Leonid Kuchma and presidential-administration chief Viktor Medvedchuk, of stealing 3 million votes during the abortive 21 November runoff. Yushchenko also demanded that Yanukovych apologize for having called his opponents "goats" and "orange rats" in public speeches. Yanukovych repeatedly asked Yushchenko to hold talks on forming a joint policy after the planned 26 December vote. Yanukovych also sought to counterattack by claiming that the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine and the subsequent legal and political decisions to restage the runoff were a "putsch" intended to deprive him of his legitimate election victory on 21 November. JM

UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT REJECTS MOVE TO ALLOW ALL DISABLED PERSONS TO VOTE FROM HOME... The Verkhovna Rada on 21 December rejected amendments to the presidential-election law allowing all categories of disabled persons to vote from home in the 26 December presidential ballot, Interfax reported. The proposal fell 18 votes short of the 226 votes required for approval. On 8 December, in a move intended to overcome the political crisis over the flawed November runoff, the Ukrainian parliament amended the presidential-election law by limiting the right to vote from home only to the disabled persons of "the first category." Presidential candidate Yushchenko and his supporters claimed that home voting and absentee ballots were the main tool for manipulating the last election results by the camp of his rival, Prime Minister Yanukovych. JM

...AND FORMS COMMISSION TO PROBE SACKING OF SECURITY SERVICE DEPUTY CHIEF. The Verkhovna Rada on 21 December set up an ad hoc commission to investigate the circumstances under which President Leonid Kuchma recently dismissed Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) Deputy Director Volodymyr Satsyuk (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 16 December 2004), Interfax reported. Media reports have suggested that presidential candidate Yushchenko, who is suffering from dioxin poisoning, might have ingested poison at Satsyuk's dacha on 5 September, where he meet with Satsyuk and SBU chief Ihor Smeshko for dinner (see "RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report," 15 December 2004). "If the president wanted to prevent the [illegal] combining of positions [by Satsyuk, who was simultaneously a legislator], that's one thing," said lawmaker Vasyl Havrylyuk, head of the newly created commission. "But if Satsyuk was involved in Yushchenko's poisoning, then the reason behind his dismissal might be different. We need to sort this out." Some experts have claimed that Yushchenko's symptoms developed too soon to have been the result of poisoning on 5 September. JM

"Will Ukraine's 'orange revolution' spread to Russia?" might seem like an improbable question to ask in the absence of any rivals to President Vladimir Putin. After all, Putin easily won reelection in March. Yet, a torrent of ink has been spilled in the Russia media in recent weeks posing exactly that question. The answers reflect not just how the authors view events in Kyiv, but the desirability of participatory democracy in Russia.

Among the gamut of responses perhaps the most "militant" was that of Viktor Militarev, vice president of the National Strategy Institute. In article for "Rossiiskie vesti," No. 42, he declares: "The main aim of the 'orange' revolutionaries is clearly being overlooked -- [their target] is Russia. In Kyiv, we can observe several processes occurring simultaneously. The forces at play are not simply dissatisfied with Vladimir Putin. [They] are prepared for active engagement in the overthrow of the President of Russia. In the first place, I have in mind [former oligarch] Boris Berezovskii and [Yukos shareholder] Leonid Nevzlin."

In an interview with dni.ru on 25 November, Marat Gelman, a political campaign consultant who is believed to have worked on Yanukovych's campaign, also floated the idea that opposition presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko received financial support from Berezovskii. According to Gelman, it is Berezovskii's role that prompted Putin to play such an active role in the Ukrainian race. Yushchenko's big mistake -- according to Gelman -- was taking money from Berezovskii in the first place, thus provoking Putin's ire.

Writing for RosBalt on 24 November, Vladislav Kraev argues that the threat of a "velvet revolution" in Russia is a real one, but it exists primarily in the long term. According to Kraev, the experience of the last 10 years in the post-Soviet space shows that any kind of election is "risky," even when there is a "charismatic" leader such as Boris Yeltsin or an experienced politician such as Eduard Shevardnadze or Heidar Aliyev. "And when the acting head of the government is leaving then the risk doubles," he writes. "Russia in 2008 will confront the necessity of the search for an alternative scenario."

"Russian liberals," Kraev wrote, "sincerely enraptured by the revolution of their neighbors and their development of an active 'civil society,' for some reason do not want to hear that people on the streets say 'Ukraine isn't Russia.' This is really so! Therefore, any poorly concealed hopes [on the part] of politicians and political analysts for a future repetition of the velvet revolution in Moscow appear completely naive. My advice for the doubters: Remember October 1993!"

In an interview with RFE/RL's Moscow bureau on 9 December, Vyacheslav Nikonov of the Politika Foundation echoed both Militarev's and Kraev's sentiments. Nikonov argued that what happened in Ukraine was the result of a long planned "special operation" that was "successful only because the Ukrainian government simply capitulated before this special operation." The Russian government, he notes, will never do this. "It is completely obvious to me that if the president of Ukraine had been not [Leonid] Kuchma but [Boris] Yeltsin, then no kind of orange revolution would have had a chance," Nikonov said. "Yeltsin had a lot more will than Kuchma, as he demonstrated effectively and actively in 1993."

In an interview RFE/RL's Moscow bureau on 9 December, former Union of Rightist Forces leader Boris Nemtsov suggested that the stories about excessive Western influence in Ukraine might be a device that Russian authorities are using to avoid telling the truth about what really happened in Ukraine. He said Russia's authorities "treat their own people cynically and invent such arguments of the type that the West influenced [events], or the campaign consultants worked poorly -- anything but the truth that the people were tired of the Kuchma regime, the people were living in despair and lawlessness and their last drop of patience was spent when the election was falsified."

Speaking on the same RFE/RL broadcast, Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii declared that regardless of one's interpretation of events in Ukraine, direct parallels cannot be drawn with Russia as circumstances in that country are completely different from those in Ukraine. "Ukraine didn't have 10 years of war in Chechnya," he said. "There were no executions in front of the Supreme Soviet in 1993 by tanks. There was no privatization as it was done here in Russia. Ukraine doesn't have a resource-based economy. In addition, for 15 years everyone in Ukraine has been saying firmly and understandably that they want to be a European country, independent of what their leaders were really doing. And this means that in Ukraine, the preconditions for the creation of a civil society turned out to be stronger as a result, and we are now observing this. In Russia, the situation is different."

So the answer to the question would seem to be "not yet" from both ends of the political spectrum -- the conditions are not yet ripe for importing the "orange revolution" from Kyiv to Moscow. From the liberal point of view, civil society has not yet developed enough, and from the nationalist point of view, Russian authorities will not bend in the face of a Western-orchestrated uprising.

In the meantime, however, both sides can use events in Kyiv to further their own agendas. In an article for RBK on 1 December, Mikhail Chernov declared: "The harsh polemic around the 'orange revolution' sheds light on the existing situation in Russia: In our country there are sufficiently influential forces whose activities are directed against the existing government." Chernov goes on to quote Aleksandr Sobyanin, director of the Strategic Planning Service of the Association of Cross-border Cooperation, who calls for a "quick change of the elite at all levels of government power" because there are "representatives of Boris Yeltsin's business group, regional elites, the majority of the mass media, and the PR community, [who] will not accept and cannot accept a widening of Russia up to the borders of the former Soviet Union."

PUTIN AND GERMAN CHANCELLOR OPEN RUSSIAN-GERMAN SUMMIT. President Vladimir Putin arrived on 20 December in Hamburg for a two-day Russian-German summit with German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and other German politicians, Russian media reported. Speaking to journalists, Putin said that he will discuss with Schroeder "any issues," including cooperation with the European Union in normalizing the situation in Chechnya, the situation in Ukraine, media freedom in Russia, and the Russian president's political reforms, strana.ru reported. Putin said that Schroeder, speaking on behalf of the EU, had proposed the active participation of the union in finding a solution to the Chechen problem and said that "Russia took this proposal seriously," RIA-Novosti reported on 20 December. The majority of Putin's cabinet, including Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, as well as security and intelligence chiefs, are attending the summit, strana.ru reported. Because of his good relations with Schroeder, Putin is likely to extend his visit and stay in Germany for Western Christmas, the website reported. VY

POLL SAYS KAZAKHS DON'T EXPECT REPEAT OF UKRAINE EVENTS. A poll conducted on 5-13 December among 2,480 respondents in 17 major Kazakh cities by the National Association of Sociologists and Political Scientists found that a slim majority support President Nursultan Nazarbaev and few expect a repeat of the events in Ukraine when Kazakhstan holds a presidential election in 2006, Interfax-Kazakhstan reported on 20 December. When asked who they would vote for if a presidential election was held today, 50.6 percent of respondents named President Nazarbaev. Asked whether a "Ukrainian situation" is possible in Kazakhstan, only 16.4 percent replied "I think so," with 43.3 percent saying "I don't think so," and 40.1 percent finding the question difficult to answer. U.S. Ambassador to Kazakhstan John Ordway seemed to agree, telling a news conference on 20 December that a "Ukraine scenario" in Kazakhstan is "a rather far-fetched comparison," Interfax-Kazakhstan reported. DK

KYRGYZ OPPOSITION OBJECTS TO PRESIDENT'S WARNINGS. The People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan held a news conference in Bishkek on 20 December with the participation of legislators Azimbek Nazarov and Ismail Isakov, former Education Minister Ishengul Boljurova, and Zamira Sydykova, editor in chief of the newspaper "Respublica," RFE/RL's Kyrgyz Service reported. Speakers disputed President Askar Akaev's 17 December contention that 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections are likely to cause rising tension (see "RFE/RL Newsline," 20 December 2004). The People's Movement said in a statement that the president's remarks were "precautionary brainwashing of people about large-scale repression being prepared in Kyrgyzstan under the pretext of the fight against terrorism and religious and political extremism," Kyrgyzinfo reported. Participants rejected official criticism of a "Georgian" or "Ukrainian" scenario, describing events there as peaceful protests against falsified elections, akipress.org reported. "We do not rule out the possibility of this kind of scenario for Kyrgyzstan, but we are not going to organize it," Boljurova and Sydykova said. DK

"Will Ukraine's 'orange revolution' spread to Russia?" might seem like an improbable question to ask in the absence of any rivals to President Vladimir Putin. After all, Putin easily won reelection in March. Yet, a torrent of ink has been spilled in the Russia media in recent weeks posing exactly that question. The answers reflect not just how the authors view events in Kyiv, but the desirability of participatory democracy in Russia.

Among the gamut of responses perhaps the most "militant" was that of Viktor Militarev, vice president of the National Strategy Institute. In article for "Rossiiskie vesti," No. 42, he declares: "The main aim of the 'orange' revolutionaries is clearly being overlooked -- [their target] is Russia. In Kyiv, we can observe several processes occurring simultaneously. The forces at play are not simply dissatisfied with Vladimir Putin. [They] are prepared for active engagement in the overthrow of the President of Russia. In the first place, I have in mind [former oligarch] Boris Berezovskii and [Yukos shareholder] Leonid Nevzlin."

In an interview with dni.ru on 25 November, Marat Gelman, a political campaign consultant who is believed to have worked on Yanukovych's campaign, also floated the idea that opposition presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko received financial support from Berezovskii. According to Gelman, it is Berezovskii's role that prompted Putin to play such an active role in the Ukrainian race. Yushchenko's big mistake -- according to Gelman -- was taking money from Berezovskii in the first place, thus provoking Putin's ire.

Writing for RosBalt on 24 November, Vladislav Kraev argues that the threat of a "velvet revolution" in Russia is a real one, but it exists primarily in the long term. According to Kraev, the experience of the last 10 years in the post-Soviet space shows that any kind of election is "risky," even when there is a "charismatic" leader such as Boris Yeltsin or an experienced politician such as Eduard Shevardnadze or Heidar Aliyev. "And when the acting head of the government is leaving then the risk doubles," he writes. "Russia in 2008 will confront the necessity of the search for an alternative scenario."

"Russian liberals," Kraev wrote, "sincerely enraptured by the revolution of their neighbors and their development of an active 'civil society,' for some reason do not want to hear that people on the streets say 'Ukraine isn't Russia.' This is really so! Therefore, any poorly concealed hopes [on the part] of politicians and political analysts for a future repetition of the velvet revolution in Moscow appear completely naive. My advice for the doubters: Remember October 1993!"

In an interview with RFE/RL's Moscow bureau on 9 December, Vyacheslav Nikonov of the Politika Foundation echoed both Militarev's and Kraev's sentiments. Nikonov argued that what happened in Ukraine was the result of a long planned "special operation" that was "successful only because the Ukrainian government simply capitulated before this special operation." The Russian government, he notes, will never do this. "It is completely obvious to me that if the president of Ukraine had been not [Leonid] Kuchma but [Boris] Yeltsin, then no kind of orange revolution would have had a chance," Nikonov said. "Yeltsin had a lot more will than Kuchma, as he demonstrated effectively and actively in 1993."

In an interview RFE/RL's Moscow bureau on 9 December, former Union of Rightist Forces leader Boris Nemtsov suggested that the stories about excessive Western influence in Ukraine might be a device that Russian authorities are using to avoid telling the truth about what really happened in Ukraine. He said Russia's authorities "treat their own people cynically and invent such arguments of the type that the West influenced [events], or the campaign consultants worked poorly -- anything but the truth that the people were tired of the Kuchma regime, the people were living in despair and lawlessness and their last drop of patience was spent when the election was falsified."

Speaking on the same RFE/RL broadcast, Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii declared that regardless of one's interpretation of events in Ukraine, direct parallels cannot be drawn with Russia as circumstances in that country are completely different from those in Ukraine. "Ukraine didn't have 10 years of war in Chechnya," he said. "There were no executions in front of the Supreme Soviet in 1993 by tanks. There was no privatization as it was done here in Russia. Ukraine doesn't have a resource-based economy. In addition, for 15 years everyone in Ukraine has been saying firmly and understandably that they want to be a European country, independent of what their leaders were really doing. And this means that in Ukraine, the preconditions for the creation of a civil society turned out to be stronger as a result, and we are now observing this. In Russia, the situation is different."

So the answer to the question would seem to be "not yet" from both ends of the political spectrum -- the conditions are not yet ripe for importing the "orange revolution" from Kyiv to Moscow. From the liberal point of view, civil society has not yet developed enough, and from the nationalist point of view, Russian authorities will not bend in the face of a Western-orchestrated uprising.

In the meantime, however, both sides can use events in Kyiv to further their own agendas. In an article for RBK on 1 December, Mikhail Chernov declared: "The harsh polemic around the 'orange revolution' sheds light on the existing situation in Russia: In our country there are sufficiently influential forces whose activities are directed against the existing government." Chernov goes on to quote Aleksandr Sobyanin, director of the Strategic Planning Service of the Association of Cross-border Cooperation, who calls for a "quick change of the elite at all levels of government power" because there are "representatives of Boris Yeltsin's business group, regional elites, the majority of the mass media, and the PR community, [who] will not accept and cannot accept a widening of Russia up to the borders of the former Soviet Union."

"Will Ukraine's 'orange revolution' spread to Russia?" might seem like an improbable question in the absence of any rivals to President Vladimir Putin. After all, Putin easily won reelection in March. Yet, a torrent of ink has been spilled in the Russia media in recent weeks posing exactly that question. The answers reflect not just how the authors view events in Kyiv but also the desirability of participatory democracy in Russia.

Among the gamut of responses perhaps the most "militant" was that of Viktor Militarev, vice president of the National Strategy Institute. In an article for "Rossiiskie vesti," No. 42, he declared that the "main aim of the 'orange' revolutionaries is clearly being overlooked -- [their target] is Russia. In Kyiv we can observe several processes occurring simultaneously. The forces at play are not simply dissatisfied with Vladimir Putin. [They] are prepared to engage actively in the overthrow of the Russian president. Firstly, I have in mind [former oligarch] Boris Berezovskii and [major Yukos shareholder] Leonid Nevzlin."

In an earlier interview with dni.ru on 25 November, Marat Gelman, a political strategist who is believed to have worked on the presidential campaign of Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, also floated the idea that opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko received financial support from Berezovskii. Moreover, according to Gelman, it was Berezovskii's role that prompted Putin to play such an active role in the Ukrainian race. This, according to Gelman, was Yushchenko's big mistake.

Writing for RosBalt on 24 November, Vladislav Kraev said he believes the threat of a "velvet revolution" is a real one but it exists in the longer rather than the medium term. According to Kraev, the experience of the last 10 years in the post-Soviet space shows that any kind of election is "risky" even when there is a "charismatic" leader such as former Russian President Boris Yeltsin or an experienced politician such as former Georgian President Eduard Shevarnadze or the late Azerbaijani leader Heidar Aliyev. "And when the acting head of the government is leaving then the risk doubles," he wrote, adding, "Russia in 2008 will confront the necessity of a search for an alternative scenario." "Russian liberals," he wrote, "sincerely enraptured by the revolutions of their neighbors and the development of an active 'civil society,' for some reason do not want to hear people on the streets say 'Ukraine isn't Russia.' This is really so! Therefore, any poorly concealed hopes of politicians and political analysts for a repetition of the velvet revolution in Moscow appears completely naive. My advice for the doubters: remember October 1993!"

In an interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service on 9 December, Vyacheslav Nikonov of the Politika Foundation echoed both Militarev's and Kraev's sentiments. He argued that what happened in Ukraine was the result of a long-planned "special operation" that was "successful only because the Ukrainian government simply capitulated before this special operation." The Russian government, he noted, will never do this. "It is completely obvious to me that if the president of Ukraine had not been [Leonid] Kuchma but Yeltsin, then no kind of 'Orange Revolution' would have had a chance. Yeltsin had a lot more will than Kuchma, as he demonstrated in 1993 effectively and actively."

In an interview with RFE/RL's Russian Service on 9 December, former leader of the Union of Rightist Forces Boris Nemtsov suggested that the stories about excessive Western influence in Ukraine may be a device that the Russian authorities are using to avoid telling the truth about what really happened in Ukraine. He said Russia's authorities "treat their own people cynically and invent such arguments of the type that the West influenced [events], or the campaign consultants worked poorly -- anything but the truth that the people were tired of Kuchma's regime, that people were living in despair and lawlessness and their last drop of patience went when the election was falsified."

Speaking on the same broadcast, Yabloko leader Grigorii Yavlinskii said that regardless of your interpretation of events in Ukraine, direct parallels cannot be made since Russia has completely different circumstances to Ukraine. "Ukraine didn't have 10 years of war in Chechnya," he said. "There were no executions in front of the Supreme Soviet in 1993 by tanks. There was no privatization as it was done here in Russia. Ukraine doesn't have a resource-based economy. In addition, for 15 years everyone in Ukraine has been saying firmly and understandably that they want to be a European country, independent of what their leaders were really doing. And this means that in Ukraine, the preconditions for the creation of a civil society turned out to be stronger as a result, and we are now observing this. In Russia, the situation is different."

So the answer would seem to be "not yet" from both ends of the political spectrum -- the conditions are not yet ripe to import the Orange Revolution from Kyiv to Moscow. From a liberal perspective, civil society is not yet developed enough, and from a nationalist perspective, the Russian authorities will not bend in the face of a Western-orchestrated uprising.

In the meantime, however, both sides can use events in Kyiv to further their own agendas. In a 1 December article in "RBK Daily," Mikhail Chernov wrote that "the harsh polemic surrounding the 'Orange Revolution' sheds light on the existing situation in Russia: In our country there are sufficiently influential forces, whose activities are directed against the existing government." Chernov went on to quote Aleksandr Sobyanin, director of the Strategic Planning Service of the Association of Crossborder Cooperation, who called for a "quick change of the elite at all levels of government" because there are "representatives of Boris Yeltsin's business group, regional elites, the majority of the mass media, and the PR community, [who] will not accept and cannot accept a widening of Russia up to the borders of the former Soviet Union."

December: A draft law on toll roads will be submitted to the government, according to the Federal Highways Agency's Construction Department

22-23 December: Belgian Foreign Minister Karel De Gucht to visit Moscow

23 December: President Putin to give his major, annual press conference in the Kremlin

        26 December: Repeat presidential runoff  in Ukraine
        26 December: Presidential election in the Republic of
Khakasia
        26 December: Second round of the gubernatorial elections in
Volgograd and Ulyanovsk oblasts
        29 December: State Duma's fall session will come to a
close
        January 2005: President Putin to visit Poland for the 60th
anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz concentration camp
        1 February 2005: Former President Boris Yeltsin's 74th
birthday
        1 February 2005: Date by which dedicated, all-volunteer

peacekeeping brigade to be set up. Unit will be available for international duty by 2006

24 February: President Putin and U.S. President George W. Bush to hold a summit in Bratislava, Slovakia

        March 2005: Gubernatorial election in Saratov Oblast
        May 2005: Commemoration of the 60th anniversary of the end of
World War II
        2006: Russia to host a G-8 summit
        1 January 2006: Date by which all political parties must

conform to law on political parties, which requires at least 50,000 members and branches in one-half of all federation subjects, or either reregister as public organizations or be dissolved.