...WANTS STRONGER ROLE FOR G-8. Chernomyrdin met with Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi in Washington on 4 May and discussed the possible role of the G-8 countries in solving the Kosova crisis, ITAR-TASS reported. In Bonn, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Avdeev said that high-ranking officials of the G-8 countries have developed a draft peace plan, which they will submit to a foreign ministers' meeting there on 6 May. German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer insisted on the "robust participation of NATO" to protect returning refugees. Chernomyrdin met in Washington with U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger and later with Vice President Al Gore. White House officials reported no breakthrough, AFP reported. In Moscow, Russian Public Television said Chernomyrdin suggested a peacekeeping force that included heavily armed troops from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and "other countries that Milosevic can trust" and lightly armed NATO troops. FS

Several post-Soviet leaders are seeking to defeat their opponents in the courtroom rather than at the ballot box, an abuse of still fragile legal systems that threatens not only to poison political life but to further limit the chances that these countries will move toward democracy.

The latest example of such an effort and its consequences appear to be taking place in Kazakhstan. Late last month, Yuri Khitrin, Kazakhstan's chief prosecutor, announced that he has reopened an investigation into the affairs of Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a former prime minister who now leads the opposition to President Nursultan Nazarbaev.

Khitrin said that he is again looking into charges that Kazhegeldin and his wife engaged in money laundering and failed to pay taxes on their earnings. In Washington during a speaking tour of the U.S., Kazhegeldin proclaimed his innocence, vowed to fight the charges in court, and suggested that this legal move is intended to intimidate him.

Whatever the merits of these specific charges against Kazhegeldin, his suggestion that the Nazarbaev government is using the veneer of legality to drive him from political life appears credible, given the ways in which the authorities have deployed the legal system against him.

Earlier this year, officials in Nazarbaev's entourage prevented Kazhegeldin from running against the incumbent president in the 10 January poll. And they clearly hope that this latest charge will prevent him from taking part in parliamentary elections slated for this fall. Indeed, even if he is able to demonstrate his innocence in court, the charges themselves may be enough to prevent him from participating.

Using the legal system to block political challengers is hardly unique to Kazakhstan. Legal maneuvering against serious political challengers has taken place in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. And most recently, the Belarusian authorities arrested Mikhail Chyhir, also a former premier and a candidate in the opposition presidential elections scheduled for this month, on charges of "grand larceny" and abuse of office in his former capacity as a top bank official.

The advantages of such a strategy to incumbents are obvious. A legal challenge has the effect of discrediting opponents they do not want to face both at home and abroad. Many people in these countries hear such charges and assume that there must be some truth to them. And many abroad find the charges plausible enough to cause them to back away from supporting opponents of the current regimes.

But this misuse of the legal system does far more than exclude opponents from taking part in elections. First, it sends a chilling message to all citizens of these countries. If the regime is prepared to go after a former prime minister like Kazhegeldin, it will certainly be willing to go after anyone, from the highest official to the most ordinary citizen.

While no one is above the law, this use of legal proceeding suggests that there can be no certainty that the authorities in these post-communist countries will employ such measures in a lawful manner. And that reduces the chances that these countries will be able to become democratic and law-based societies.

Second, it undoubtedly limits the number of people who will think about going into political life and challenging incumbents. Anyone who sees what the authorities can do to someone who challenges their power is likely to think twice before trying to get involved.

Such fears narrow the politically engaged class and make it more likely that future political change will come in a ratchet-like rather than evolutionary manner, a pattern that could throw some of these countries into chaos when the current incumbents inevitably pass from the scene.

And third, such actions increase the value of incumbency. Many officials will do what they can to remain in office lest they find themselves subject to legal challenges following their departure. Not only will such efforts tend to further restrict the possibilities of political evolution, but they almost certainly will reduce the opportunities for the development of another generation of active political leaders.

Moreover, such legal actions against political opponents have the effect of increasing the importance of the immunity from prosecution that members of most of the parliaments in this region now enjoy. Few current members will want to give that protection up by leaving office, and thus many of them may be willing to vote for measures that extend their terms or guarantee their reelections.

At the same time, many may try to become deputies precisely to gain that advantage. But such efforts have another and perhaps more insidious consequence: they tend to isolate the political class from the population and thus reinforce the Soviet-era notion that the elite is permitted to do things that the citizenry cannot.

It is a fundamental principle of democratic governance that no one should stand above the law. But it is equally important that no one should be victimized by the political misuse of legal norms.

INFLATION IN UKRAINE EXCEEDS 2 PERCENT. Ukraine's monthly inflation rate reached 2.3 percent in April, up from 1 percent in March and February, AP reported on 4 May, citing the State Statistics Committee. The hike was triggered by the government's April resolution increasing the price of electricity and gas, in compliance with the IMF requirements. Ukraine's planned inflation rate in 1999 is 19 percent, but many analysts see this figure as overly optimistic, arguing that the government is likely to print money to pay off wage and pension arrears before the 31 October presidential elections. JM

LUCINSCHI WORRIED ABOUT DELAY IN WITHDRAWAL OF RUSSIAN ARMS. Moldovan President Petru Lucinschi said on 4 May that he is concerned that the second postponement of the scheduled Kyiv summit will delay the withdrawal of Russian weapons and military equipment from the separatist Transdniester region, Basapress reported. Lucinschi, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, Russian Premier Yevgenii Primakov, and Transdniester leader Igor Smirnov were to meet in Kyiv on 30 April, but the meeting was canceled due to Primakov's back ailment. Some 12 trainloads of Russian arms are to return to Russia this month under an agreement signed by Moldovan Premier Ion Sturza and then Russian First Deputy Premier Vadim Gustov on 21 April. Gustov was sacked one week after his Moldovan visit. PB

Several post-Soviet leaders are seeking to defeat their opponents in the courtroom rather than at the ballot box, an abuse of still fragile legal systems that threatens not only to poison political life but to further limit the chances that these countries will move toward democracy.

The latest example of such an effort and its consequences appear to be taking place in Kazakhstan. Late last month, Yuri Khitrin, Kazakhstan's chief prosecutor, announced that he has reopened an investigation into the affairs of Akezhan Kazhegeldin, a former prime minister who now leads the opposition to President Nursultan Nazarbaev.

Khitrin said that he is again looking into charges that Kazhegeldin and his wife engaged in money laundering and failed to pay taxes on their earnings. In Washington during a speaking tour of the U.S., Kazhegeldin proclaimed his innocence, vowed to fight the charges in court, and suggested that this legal move is intended to intimidate him.

Whatever the merits of these specific charges against Kazhegeldin, his suggestion that the Nazarbaev government is using the veneer of legality to drive him from political life appears credible, given the ways in which the authorities have deployed the legal system against him.

Earlier this year, officials in Nazarbaev's entourage prevented Kazhegeldin from running against the incumbent president in the 10 January poll. And they clearly hope that this latest charge will prevent him from taking part in parliamentary elections slated for this fall. Indeed, even if he is able to demonstrate his innocence in court, the charges themselves may be enough to prevent him from participating.

Using the legal system to block political challengers is hardly unique to Kazakhstan. Legal maneuvering against serious political challengers has taken place in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, and the Russian Federation. And most recently, the Belarusian authorities arrested Mikhail Chyhir, also a former premier and a candidate in the opposition presidential elections scheduled for this month, on charges of "grand larceny" and abuse of office in his former capacity as a top bank official.

The advantages of such a strategy to incumbents are obvious. A legal challenge has the effect of discrediting opponents they do not want to face both at home and abroad. Many people in these countries hear such charges and assume that there must be some truth to them. And many abroad find the charges plausible enough to cause them to back away from supporting opponents of the current regimes.

But this misuse of the legal system does far more than exclude opponents from taking part in elections. First, it sends a chilling message to all citizens of these countries. If the regime is prepared to go after a former prime minister like Kazhegeldin, it will certainly be willing to go after anyone, from the highest official to the most ordinary citizen.

While no one is above the law, this use of legal proceeding suggests that there can be no certainty that the authorities in these post-communist countries will employ such measures in a lawful manner. And that reduces the chances that these countries will be able to become democratic and law-based societies.

Second, it undoubtedly limits the number of people who will think about going into political life and challenging incumbents. Anyone who sees what the authorities can do to someone who challenges their power is likely to think twice before trying to get involved.

Such fears narrow the politically engaged class and make it more likely that future political change will come in a ratchet-like rather than evolutionary manner, a pattern that could throw some of these countries into chaos when the current incumbents inevitably pass from the scene.

And third, such actions increase the value of incumbency. Many officials will do what they can to remain in office lest they find themselves subject to legal challenges following their departure. Not only will such efforts tend to further restrict the possibilities of political evolution, but they almost certainly will reduce the opportunities for the development of another generation of active political leaders.

Moreover, such legal actions against political opponents have the effect of increasing the importance of the immunity from prosecution that members of most of the parliaments in this region now enjoy. Few current members will want to give that protection up by leaving office, and thus many of them may be willing to vote for measures that extend their terms or guarantee their reelections.

At the same time, many may try to become deputies precisely to gain that advantage. But such efforts have another and perhaps more insidious consequence: they tend to isolate the political class from the population and thus reinforce the Soviet-era notion that the elite is permitted to do things that the citizenry cannot.

It is a fundamental principle of democratic governance that no one should stand above the law. But it is equally important that no one should be victimized by the political misuse of legal norms.