masthead



When the Russian economy began to melt down after the ruble's collapse in mid-August, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka launched yet another campaign for the closer integration of Belarus and Russia. The two countries have been unsuccessfully trying to consummate some kind of merger since Lukashenka came to power in 1994. But this time, the "third Slavic brother," Ukraine, has been drawn into the process.

Kyiv has been wary of any initiatives aimed at closer integration not only with Russia and Belarus but also within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ukraine stresses that in relations with post-Soviet states, economic issues should take precedence over political ones, while asserting that bilateral accords are more important than multilateral ones. Ironically, the event that sparked a renewed outburst of integration propaganda was Russia's financial crisis and subsequent economic slump.

Addressing the Ukrainian Supreme Council on 29 September, Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadii Seleznev called upon Ukraine to form a Slavic union with Russia and Belarus. Some 50 deputies of the right-wing Rukh party jeered at Seleznev and branded his speech a "provocation." But 120 or so Communist deputies received Seleznev's appeal with loud applause. In what seemed to be an attempt at damage control, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma immediately responded that he "categorically opposes" such a union. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, pointing out that Russia is a multiethnic country, said the first consideration should be how "tens of millions of non-Slavs" in Russia would react if their state became part of a Slavic union.

Nonetheless, the merger proposal was made by a high-ranking official and received much publicity in both Ukraine and Russia. In fact, it may well become a propaganda time bomb planted in Ukraine's fragile economic system. An impoverished population, large parts of which have not been paid for months, may eventually turn a deaf ear to Kuchma's promises to improve the situation in independent Ukraine and may begin to heed Lukashenka's nostalgic appeal to restore the former "unbreakable" union and state-regulated economy.

Lukashenka had his moment of triumph when Russia's financial market collapsed in August. The IMF recommendations, he argued, aim at "disrupting the national economic system of post-Soviet republics" rather than "curing" it. Belarus, in his opinion, has a successful state-regulated economy that fares well without foreign advice and assistance. Lukashenka even went so far as to offer to act as consultant to Russian President Boris Yeltsin by showing him how Belarus's economic experience can be applied in Russia.

A large amount of pro-Slavic union propaganda has come from other quarters within Belarus. The Chamber of Representatives, the lower house of the legislature, called on the Russian State Duma to urgently adopt bills on introducing a single Belarusian-Russian citizenship, joint state symbols, a Belarusian-Russian Union anthem, and direct elections to the Belarusian-Russian Union Parliamentary Assembly. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry announced that Minsk has "programs" to help Russia overcome its crisis, while Lukashenka vowed to supply foodstuffs to stave off famine in Russia.

Lukashenka used the September visit to Minsk of the Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia to try to secure the support of the Orthodox Church for his integration cause. "Orthodoxy is the only barrier that protects us from falling into abyss" he said, pledging to make Christian values "the state ideology of Belarus."

He also took advantage of the Kosova crisis to portray himself as a defender of the Slavic world as a whole, offering military help to Yugoslavia. And he strongly condemned Bulgaria and Romania for granting NATO the right to use their airspace in the event of military action against Yugoslavia and thus for "betraying Slavic [sic] unity."

So far, there have been no signs that any of those proposals have been treated seriously by other statesmen or had the intended effect. At another level, however, their effectiveness is more difficult to ascertain. Lukashenka's actions and statements are primarily addressed to ordinary people, to collective farm and industrial workers who are suffering most on account of the crisis in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Such people elected him president in 1994, and a September poll showed that amid Belarus's worst economic crisis since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Lukashenka's popularity jumped to 55 percent, up 11 percent compared with last December.

This measure of his popularity offers a clue to what Russian and Ukrainian workers may privately think about Lukashenka's idea of closer Slavic unity. At the same time, the appeal of such a union is not confined to the Slavic former Soviet republics. An Armenian initiative last year collected 1 million signatures in support for that country's accession to the RussiaBelarus Union. Similar, albeit more modest campaigns, have also been launched in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.

Belarus is the only post-Soviet republic that has made reintegration a sustained, long-term policy. Unable to use any economic levers to promote his policy of integration, Lukashenka makes use of his greatest asset: an almost hypnotic populist appeal to the man on the street. In fact, he appeals directly to the deeply wounded pride of people confronted with their humiliating economic misery and what they perceive as their political decline following the demise of the Soviet Empire. Wounded pride seldom responds in a friendly or creative manner. That is why Lukashenka-- although marginalized and isolated on the international scene--should be regarded with due concern as potentially one of the biggest troublemakers in the post-Soviet area.

UKRAINE HAS NO PLANS TO RAISE TRANSIT FEES ON RUSSIAN NATURAL GAS. Ukrainian First Deputy Prime Minister Anatoliy Holubchenko told AP on 17 October that Kyiv does not plan to increase charges for the transport of Russian natural gas across its territory but will seek lower prices for the fuel Ukraine buys from Russia. He noted that Ukraine has succeeded in reducing its gas debt to Russian from $1.2 billion in January 1998 to $740 million now. And he added that Ukraine will reduce its debt still further by sending food to Russia. PG

UKRAINIAN PRESIDENT FEARS NEW DIVISION OF EUROPE. Following a 16 October meeting in Vienna with European Commission President Jacques Santer, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said that the inclusion of Poland in the EU could lead to tighter visa restrictions against his countrymen and thus cut Ukraine off from Europe, Western agencies reported. Santer responded that the EU has no such intention and will support Kyiv's efforts to reform and join the World Trade Organization. He also announced an additional 150 million ecu balance-of-payments loan to Ukraine, adding that the EU is prepared to help complete two nuclear reactors in Ukraine if Kyiv closes the troubled Chornobyl by the year 2000. PG

When the Russian economy began to melt down after the ruble's collapse in mid-August, Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka launched yet another campaign for the closer integration of Belarus and Russia. The two countries have been unsuccessfully trying to consummate some kind of merger since Lukashenka came to power in 1994. But this time, the "third Slavic brother," Ukraine, has been drawn into the process.

Kyiv has been wary of any initiatives aimed at closer integration not only with Russia and Belarus but also within the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ukraine stresses that in relations with post-Soviet states, economic issues should take precedence over political ones, while asserting that bilateral accords are more important than multilateral ones. Ironically, the event that sparked a renewed outburst of integration propaganda was Russia's financial crisis and subsequent economic slump.

Addressing the Ukrainian Supreme Council on 29 September, Russian State Duma Chairman Gennadii Seleznev called upon Ukraine to form a Slavic union with Russia and Belarus. Some 50 deputies of the right-wing Rukh party jeered at Seleznev and branded his speech a "provocation." But 120 or so Communist deputies received Seleznev's appeal with loud applause. In what seemed to be an attempt at damage control, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma immediately responded that he "categorically opposes" such a union. Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, pointing out that Russia is a multiethnic country, said the first consideration should be how "tens of millions of non-Slavs" in Russia would react if their state became part of a Slavic union.

Nonetheless, the merger proposal was made by a high-ranking official and received much publicity in both Ukraine and Russia. In fact, it may well become a propaganda time bomb planted in Ukraine's fragile economic system. An impoverished population, large parts of which have not been paid for months, may eventually turn a deaf ear to Kuchma's promises to improve the situation in independent Ukraine and may begin to heed Lukashenka's nostalgic appeal to restore the former "unbreakable" union and state-regulated economy.

Lukashenka had his moment of triumph when Russia's financial market collapsed in August. The IMF recommendations, he argued, aim at "disrupting the national economic system of post-Soviet republics" rather than "curing" it. Belarus, in his opinion, has a successful state-regulated economy that fares well without foreign advice and assistance. Lukashenka even went so far as to offer to act as consultant to Russian President Boris Yeltsin by showing him how Belarus's economic experience can be applied in Russia.

A large amount of pro-Slavic union propaganda has come from other quarters within Belarus. The Chamber of Representatives, the lower house of the legislature, called on the Russian State Duma to urgently adopt bills on introducing a single Belarusian-Russian citizenship, joint state symbols, a Belarusian-Russian Union anthem, and direct elections to the Belarusian-Russian Union Parliamentary Assembly. The Belarusian Foreign Ministry announced that Minsk has "programs" to help Russia overcome its crisis, while Lukashenka vowed to supply foodstuffs to stave off famine in Russia.

Lukashenka used the September visit to Minsk of the Patriarch of Moscow and All-Russia to try to secure the support of the Orthodox Church for his integration cause. "Orthodoxy is the only barrier that protects us from falling into abyss" he said, pledging to make Christian values "the state ideology of Belarus."

He also took advantage of the Kosova crisis to portray himself as a defender of the Slavic world as a whole, offering military help to Yugoslavia. And he strongly condemned Bulgaria and Romania for granting NATO the right to use their airspace in the event of military action against Yugoslavia and thus for "betraying Slavic [sic] unity."

So far, there have been no signs that any of those proposals have been treated seriously by other statesmen or had the intended effect. At another level, however, their effectiveness is more difficult to ascertain. Lukashenka's actions and statements are primarily addressed to ordinary people, to collective farm and industrial workers who are suffering most on account of the crisis in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Such people elected him president in 1994, and a September poll showed that amid Belarus's worst economic crisis since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Lukashenka's popularity jumped to 55 percent, up 11 percent compared with last December.

This measure of his popularity offers a clue to what Russian and Ukrainian workers may privately think about Lukashenka's idea of closer Slavic unity. At the same time, the appeal of such a union is not confined to the Slavic former Soviet republics. An Armenian initiative last year collected 1 million signatures in support for that country's accession to the RussiaBelarus Union. Similar, albeit more modest campaigns, have also been launched in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan.

Belarus is the only post-Soviet republic that has made reintegration a sustained, long-term policy. Unable to use any economic levers to promote his policy of integration, Lukashenka makes use of his greatest asset: an almost hypnotic populist appeal to the man on the street. In fact, he appeals directly to the deeply wounded pride of people confronted with their humiliating economic misery and what they perceive as their political decline following the demise of the Soviet Empire. Wounded pride seldom responds in a friendly or creative manner. That is why Lukashenka-- although marginalized and isolated on the international scene--should be regarded with due concern as potentially one of the biggest troublemakers in the post-Soviet area.