Refusal From Euro-Integration: What Next?

By the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation 

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On November 21 the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the resolution to suspend signing the Association Agreement with the EU in Vilnius, November 28-29. The government justified its decision by the economic losses that Ukraine would sustain due to the aggravation of relations with Russia. As was expected, the EU reacted to this decision negatively and warned that a delay in Ukraine’s Euro-integration may drag on for an indefinite period of time.   

Although over the past several weeks the chances of Ukraine signing the Association Agreement became less and less with every day, few expected that this process would be suspended due to the unilateral decision of the Ukrainian leadership. The explanation for this step is the same as for the artificial barriers that of late the ruling team has been putting up along the path to signing the agreement. It is glaringly obvious that over the past few months President Yanukovych considered the possibility of signing the agreement as a way of receiving considerable financial support in conditions of a worsening economic situation in Ukraine and the disastrous underfinancing of the national budget. The talks between Ukraine’s leaders and Russia had a similar objective, though this process was far from transparent.   

Accordingly, Yanukovych’s choice in favour of Russia can be explained by one main factor- it was easier for him to reach an agreement with Vladimir Putin than with the EU. The reasons for the failure of talks with the EU are quite clear: while the European side demanded Ukraine demonstrate visible progress in compliance with democratic norms and principles, the Ukrainian leadership instead demanded financial aid from the EU.

There was a strong probability that the EU would agree to sign the Association Agreement even if Tymoshenko was not released from prison before the summit in Vilnius, albeit on condition that Ukraine formally fulfill all three requirements of the EU: adopt the laws on the prosecutor’s office, the elections and the medical treatment of prisoners abroad. Perhaps in this case EU member states would agree to turn a blind eye to its requirement of releasing Tymoshenko from prison and deferring it until after the summit in Vilnius. 

In any case, in spite of the extremely low probability of Tymoshenko being released after the summit in Vilnius, it turned out that President Yanukovych is not ready for such a scenario. The main obstacle was clearly that the European side did not take the blackmail bait of the Ukrainian leadership concerning the allocation of funds in exchange for Ukraine’s consent to stick to the Euro-integration path and not fall into the grip of Russia. Despite the serious concerns of many European leaders regarding the continued application of strong pressure by Russia on Ukraine, the irresponsible behavior of the Ukrainian president and his team, who demanded money in exchange for illusory concessions, eliminated the possibility of the two sides reaching an understanding.   

In light of this, it was easier for Yanukovych to find a common ground with his Russian counterpart. If to believe the official statements of the Ukrainian leaders, the economic pressure applied by Moscow in the form of various sanctions imposed late this summer played its role in forcing Kyiv to refuse to sign the Association Agreement. Moreover, it is clear that such pressure was only a secondary factor, while the main reason that the Ukrainian president de-facto turned to Russia was the dire economic situation in Ukraine that was manifested in not only a decline in industrial output, but also a decrease in GDP starting at the end of 2012. As such, the Ukrainian government has only itself to blame for the fact that the country was so vulnerable to pressure from Russia due to its inability to conduct an effective economic policy, create a favourable investment climate in the country and, at the very least, reduce rampant corruption over the past three years. 

Moreover, hoping to sign the EU Association Agreement the Ukrainian leadership should have foreseen the aggressive moves on the part of Russia and prepared for their neutralization. Instead, it chose to take a different path to give into the pressure of Moscow in exchange for promises of financial aid. Similarly, the possible lowering of prices of Russian gas will most likely backfire and instead of easing the fate of Ukrainian enterprises will lead to the creation of a new corrupt system of delivery of natural gas to Ukraine, where the difference between the old and new prices of gas will line the pockets of the closest inner circles of the presidents of both Russia and Ukraine. At the same time, one should not expect that assistance from Russia will be of no benefit - clearly, in exchange for this the Russian side will demand economic preferences and strengthen its political influence on the decision-making process in Ukraine.   

Yanukovych’s refusal of association with the EU will clearly mean for Ukraine a different quality of domestic political life. In the event the agreement is signed, the president and his milieu should consider the obligations and institutional limitations they assumed when making decisions inside the country; if the agreement is not signed it will mean that Yanukovych’s hands will be fully untied. Given that his main goal is holding on to power for an indefinite term and will use the full arsenal of possible methods of achieving this goal, the reversal of democratic processes in Ukraine will soon pick up steam. The only factor that could be an obstacle to this is active civil resistance. In the nearest days it will become clear to what extent Ukrainians are prepared to stand up for their right to live according to European standards.